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ABSTRACT
The Belt and Road Initiative is the most ambitious infrastructure development project 
in recent history. It is an important factor in China’s rise equation. However, despite its 
geoeconomic starting point, the project has profound global implications. The aim of this 
study is to analyse three basic questions: 1) What is it? 2) How is it financed? 3)Why was 
it launched? In answering these questions, I argue that the New Silk Road may represent 
a means for China to influence the established international economic order.
KEYWORDS: Belt and Road Initiative, One Belt One Road, China, international 
economic order, geoeconomics.
RESUMEN
La Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta es el proyecto de desarrollo de infraestructuras más 
ambicioso en la historia reciente. Supone un importante factor en la ecuación del ascenso 
de China. Sin embargo, pese a que tiene un principio geoeconómico, el proyecto conlleva 
profundas implicaciones globales. El objetivo de este estudio es analizar tres preguntas 
básicas: 1) ¿Qué es? 2) ¿Cómo está financiado? 3) ¿Por qué se lanzó? Al responder a estas 
preguntas, sostengo que la Nueva Ruta de la Seda puede representar un medio para que 
China influya en el orden económico internacional establecido.
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Introduction
The international economic order established by the United States (as well 
as Europe and Japan to a lesser extent) after World War II relies on different 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, or the World Trade Organization. However, the rise of China 
is a disruptive element in this equation. A trend that has been exacerbated 
after President Xi Jinping launched in 2013 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
The initiative, and its surrounding institutions, is one of the most ambitious 
infrastructure projects in recent history and is called upon to transform the 
world as we know it. 
Although the BRI has a geoeconomic starting point, there are geopolitical 
implications for the regional and the global order that should not be over-
looked. The Belt and Road Initiative is much more than just a mere trade po-
licy. In this regard, the goal of the paper is to respond to three key questions. 
First of all: 1) What is the BRI and its sphere of influence? To answer this ques-
tion, the paper gives an overview of the history of the Silk Route and examines 
the project from a descriptive viewpoint. The second section concerns finan-
cing: 2) How is the BRI financed and how does the project fit into the existing 
gap in infrastructure investment in Asia? The last part refers to the motiva-
tions behind the BRI: 3) Why did the Chinese Government launch the BRI?
Under the descriptive method, an extensive review of academic research, 
political official discourses, Chinese Government White Papers, specialized 
press, and reports from international organisations and foundations, has been 
conducted. This analysis of pre-existing literature allows the researcher to 
construct qualitative arguments, illustrated in some cases by a quantitative 
analysis of existing data provided by international organizations, private com-
panies, and other international entities. 
What is the Belt and Road Initiative? 
The Silk Route was a network of trade routes that connected the East and 
the West. It started in China (in what is now Xi’an), and extended through 
Mongolia, India, Persia, Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Europe, and Africa. Silk trade 
was its main raison d’être, although many other textiles, spices or art crafts 
were traded as well. However, not only was it a trade route but an important 
communication channel for ideas, spiritual messages, technologies, or scien-
ces (Hansen, 2015). 
Numerous names have been given to this network of routes within the past 
centuries. “Samarkand Route” or “North and South Route” might be the most 
well-known ones. However, nowadays the most used name is the term “Silk 
Road” coined in 1877 by Ferdinand von Richthofen, German geographer and 
traveller. As far as origins of this route are concerned, there is evidence of the 
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existence of the Silk Route since the Han Dynasty (206–220 BC), although it 
is commonly related with the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD). These economic, 
cultural, political, and religious interactions lasted until the 18th century. The 
Silk Route then entered a period of decline. Nevertheless, it has flourished 
again in the 21st century (Hansen, 2015). 
In the past decades or so, China has not been the only one interested in 
digging up the Silk Road notion. This idea has remained in several countries’ 
psyche since the old project disappeared. Japan introduced the concept of 
“Silk Road Diplomacy” in 1997, to strengthen relations with different regions 
in Central Asia. In relation to the US presence in Afghanistan, the American 
Government launched in 2011 a “New Silk Road” initiative. Its main aim was 
to integrate the South Asian country with other regions “by resuming traditio-
nal trading routes and reconstructing significant infrastructure links broken 
by decades of conflict” (US Department of State, 2017). As we can see, the idea 
is not new. However, the magnitude and nature of the project could not be 
more different.
The new and ambitious China’s Belt and Road Initiative (also called “One 
Belt, One Road” or “New Silk Road”) was raised for the first time by President 
Xi Jinping in a speech titled “Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create 
a Better Future”, at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University on 7 September 2013. 
The project, according to the President’s view, aims to step forward the Chi-
nese economy, connecting different economic areas and promoting China’s 
presence in the world scenario. Nevertheless, concerns have been raised in 
the international community due to the extent, possible implications, and real 
motivations behind the project. 
The number of partners adhering to this initiative is rapidly increasing. 
In April 2019, there were 125 countries and 29 international organizations 
involved, whereas in November 2019 China already had cooperation agree-
ments with 137 countries and 30 international organizations1 (State Informa-
tion Center, 2019). This represents more than 70% of the world’s population, 
above 55% of global GNP (Pu, 2016, p. 113) and about 75% of known energy 
reserves (Hilton, 2019). 
From 2013 to 2018, the trade volume of goods between the BRI coun-
tries and China surpassed 6 trillion US dollars. In fact, between January 2019 
and September 2019, China’s trade with the BRI countries totalled about 950 
billion US dollars, and its non-financial direct investment in these countries 
topped 10 billion US dollars. Additionally, China arranged bilateral currency 
swap accords with 20 countries and established RMB clearing arrangements 
with seven countries (State Information Center, 2019). 
The BRI has been compared with the Marshall Plan, although the mag-
nitude of the Chinese project is much larger, as evidenced by these num-
1  Xi Jinping’s remarks on November 5, 2019 in the opening speech at the China Interna-
tional Import Expo in Shanghai. 
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bers. Moreover, the BRI differs from the Marshall Plan in its motivation and 
possible global implications. Under the Marshall Plan, the US and the UK 
sought, among others, geopolitical goals (such as to prevent the spread of 
communism), whereas the Chinese Government, at least in its official dis-
course, wants to promote economic prosperity and peace, regardless of poli-
tical aims. According to this official narrative, the starting point for the BRI 
is more geoeconomic than geopolitical2 (Callahan, 2016, p. 11). Furthermore, 
the challenges of the BRI to be faced outnumber those of the Marshall Plan, 
as explained below. 
Whereas “the Belt” refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt, “the Road” re-
fers to the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. The Belt is focused on inland pro-
jects, knitting together China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe. On the other 
hand, The Road aims to connect China’s coast with Europe through the South 
China Sea and the Indian Ocean; and to connect China’s coast with the South 
Pacific through the South China Sea (see Figure 1). Some of the countries in-
volved are emerging countries with high development potential, while others 
are developed countries with strong industries, minerals, energy, or tourism.
Despite the names given, the distinction between the Belt and the Road 
is not the key point. The difference is symbolic, just a matter of names. The 
important difference is that, while the inland initiative relies on international 
transport routes (taking advantage of core cities and key economic industrial 
parks), oil and natural gas pipelines and power grids, the maritime initiative is 
focused on building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting 
significant seaports and other coastal infrastructure projects (National Deve-
lopment and Reform Comission, 2015). The difficulties for coordinating such 
a diverse initiative with so different States are tremendous. 
The land-based part of the BRI is being carried out through six economic 
corridors3 that embrace different inland areas of Europe and Asia. The sea-
based part of the BRI entails a maritime route, which seeks to connect Europe, 
Africa, and Asia through the sea. In addition, in January 2018 the Chinese Go-
vernment issued a White Paper titled “China’s Arctic Policy”. The aim of this 
document is to guide China’s action in Arctic affairs. However, this blueprint 
also announced the development of a “Polar Silk Road” under the BRI, due 
to the special geographical location of the Arctic and its natural environment 
and rich resources (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic 
2  According to Yu (2017, p. 354), “geopolitics studies the influence of aspects as military, 
political, human resources and other hard power elements on the policy of a State, particularly 
its foreign policy. Meanwhile, geoeconomics focuses more on economic space, covering trans-
portation connectivity, networks, commerce, trade, investment, and financial and economic 
strengths”.
3  New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Cor-
ridor, China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic 
Corridor, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic 
Corridor. 
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of China, 2018). Consequently, there are six economic land corridors and two 
maritime routes. 
Numerous projects are being developed through these economic corridors 
and the maritime route. In December 2019, more than 100 initiatives were 
registered, such as oil and natural gas pipelines, high-speed railways (both 
freight and passenger trains), airports, seaports, or industrial parks. These 
projects are held in partner countries around Europe, Africa, and Asia (Hiels-
cher & Ibold, 2019). The pipelines used for transmission of mobile phone and 
Internet data will be particularly important in the years to come, especially in 
view of the restrictions imposed by the coronavirus situation, such as lock-
downs or teleworking (Caro, 2020). 
In this sense, the signing of the cooperation agreement with Italy in March 
2019 is especially important. It is the first G–7 country that joins the BRI, and 
the agreement has a deep symbolic value considering the reticence shown by 
some Western countries regarding geostrategic concerns. Whereas Italy has 
a huge need of investment and financing, China sees Italian ports as perfect 
places to distribute its products. 
How is the Belt and Road Initiative financed? 
The gap in infrastructure investment in Asia
Almost nobody would contest the fact that a smart investment in infras-
tructure is a crucial economic driver to develop a country’s economy and 
eradicate poverty (Ali & Pernia, 2003, p. 9). Its importance is especially 
Figure 1.  
Map of the six economic 
corridors of the Belt and 
Road Initiative
Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council and Nomura Global Economics (retrieved 
from https://www.nomuraconnects.com/focused-thinking-posts/the-belt-and-road-initiative-
globalisation-china-style/).
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high for overcoming geographical issues and reducing the high costs of 
production in landlocked countries (Yu, 2017, p. 357). In this sense, in 
Asia there is a gap of infrastructure investment of $26 trillion from 2016 
to 2030 (see Figures 2 and 3) if the region is to maintain its growth mo-
mentum, eradicate poverty and respond to climate change4 (Asian Develo-
pment Bank, 2017, p. 11). 
Estimated Infrastructure Investment Needs by Region 2016–2030 ($ billion in 2015 prices)
Region/Sub-
region
Pro-
jected 
Annual 
GDP 
Growth
2030 UN 
Popula-
tion Pro-
jection 
(billion)
2030 
Projected 
GDP Per 
Capita 
(2015 $)
Baseline Estimates Climate-adjusted Esti-
mates**
Invest-
ment 
Needs
Annual 
Average
Invest-
ment 
Needs  
as %  
of GDP
Invest-
ment 
Needs
Annual 
Average
Invest-
ment 
Needs 
as %  
of 
GDP
Central Asia 3.1 0.096 6,202 492 33 6.8 565 38 7.8
East Asia 5.1 1.503 18,602 13,781 919 4.5 16,062 1,071 5.2
South Asia* 6.5 2.059 3,446 5,477 365 7.6 6,347 423 8.8
Southeast 
Asia
5.1 0.723 7,040 2,759 184 5.0 3,147 210 5.7
The Pacific 3.1 0.014 2,889 42 2.8 8.2 46 3.1 9.1
Asia and the 
Pacific
5.3 4.396 9,277 22,551 1,503 5.1 26,166 1,744 5.9
Note: * Pakistan and Afghanistan are included in South Asia. ** Climate change adjusted 
figures include climate mitigation and climate proofing costs, but do not include other 
adaptation costs, especially those associated with sea level rise. 
Source: recovered by the author from (Asian Development Bank, 2017).
The cited Asian Development Bank study analyses four different sectors: 
power, transport, telecommunications, and water and sanitation. All these 
areas are covered by the BRI, specially the first three. As we can observe in 
the tables, East Asia (China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and 
Taiwan) needs the largest investment in infrastructure, with energy being the 
most deficient sector in terms of lack of investment.  
In this regard, the BRI could prove to be the solution, at least partially, to 
these infrastructure needs. The whole initiative is estimated in 4–8 trillion US 
dollars (Hielscher & Ibold, 2019). For this reason, several funding channels 
are needed: BRI bonds, private capital investment, Public-Private Partnerships 
4  The need would be of $22.6 trillion without climate change mitigation and adaptation 
costs. 
Figure 2. 
Estimated Infrastructure 
Investment Needs by Region
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Figure 4.  
Institutions involved in 
financing the Belt and Road 
Initiative
Figure 3.  
Estimated Infrastructure 
Investment Needs by Sector
Estimated Infrastructure Investment Needs by Sector 2016–2030 ($ billion in 2015 prices)
Sector
Baseline Estimates Climate-adjusted Estimates
Climate-related 
Investments  
(Annual)
Investment 
Needs
Annual 
Average
Share of 
Total
Investment 
Needs
Annual 
Average
Share 
of 
Total
Adap-
tation
Mitiga-
tion
Power 11,689 779 51.8 14,731 982 56.3 3 200
Transport 7,796 520 34.6 8,353 557 31.9 37 –
Telecommu-
nications 2,279 152 10.1 2,279 152 8.7 – –
Water and 
Sanitation 787 52 3.5 802 53 3.1 1 –
Total 22,551 1,503 100.0 26,166 1,744 100.0 41 200
Note: * Denotes not applicable. 
Source: Recovered by the author from (Asian Development Bank, 2017).
State-Owned Banks Policy Banks International Financing 
Institutions
State-Owned Funds
Agricultural Bank  
of China
Agricultural 
Development Bank  
of China
Asian Development Bank China Investment 
Corporation
Bank of China China Development 
Bank
Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank
Silk Road Fund
China Construction 
Bank
Export-Import Bank 
of China
New Development Bank
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank  
of China
Source: Recovered by the author from different sources.
(PPP) or State-Owned Enterprise investment (SOE), among others. In con-
nection to these channels, numerous institutional mechanisms are taking part 
in the BRI. The most remarkable ones are represented in Figure 4.
Among them, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the 
Silk Road Fund (SRF) are of particular relevance due to their ad hoc creation. 
On the one hand, the AIIB was announced in 2013, during Xi Jinping’s state 
visit in Jakarta (Indonesia). Finally, it was officially launched in 2014, and be-
gan operating in 2016 with a capital of $100 billion5. Its main aim is to support 
5  Which represents 2/3 of the capital of the Asian Development Bank and about 1/2 that of 
the World Bank. 
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the building of infrastructures in the Asia-Pacific region with a green appro-
ach. One positive impact of this new bank is that is has placed infrastructure at 
the centre of development finance regimes (Gabusi, 2017, p. 40). This new ins-
titution seeks to cooperate rather than to compete with other financing sour-
ces, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), of which China is a member 
along with other Asian and Western countries6. This is the case of developed 
countries such as the UK (with a subscription of $3,054 million and 2.91% 
of voting power in the AIIB), Germany ($4,484 million and 4.18%), France 
($3,376 million and 3.20%), Italy ($2,572 million and 2.49%) or Spain ($1,761 
million and 1.77%). All of them joined the AIIB in recent years, participating 
in the new international financial architecture. 
As some authors argue, China is following two strategies to reform the 
existing global financial system. Firstly, it is working together with emerging 
countries such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), 
that share the perception of being underrepresented in the financial interna-
tional system designed by the West, to achieve reforms. The second strategic 
line is to take steps in order to create new financial institutions, such as the 
case of the AIIB. By doing this, “China is putting more pressure on the West 
to accelerate the process of international financial reforms by challenging the 
dominant role of the World Bank and the ADB in funding transportation and 
other infrastructure projects in Asia” (Yu, 2017, p. 360). 
With the establishment of the AIIB, China has strengthened its leadership 
and influence in the regional governance. However, this new institution has 
imitated some of the Western system imperfections. This is the case of the veto 
power, that causes many troubles in the bosom of the United Nations Security 
Council. Although the Articles of Agreement of the bank do not include this 
possibility, they establish a requirement of at least 75% of total votes in order 
to amend the text, adjust the capital shares of regional members, increase the 
capital base of the bank and make other major changes. China, that is the lar-
gest shareholder, holds a total voting share of over 26%, due to its contribution 
of almost $29.78 billion. Consequently, China has de facto veto power in the 
AIIB (Yu, 2017, p. 359). 
On the other hand, the Silk Road Fund is a state-owned investment fund 
with limited liability that was established in December 2014 by the Chinese 
Government. Its main goal is to foster investment in BRI’s projects along part-
ner States. China pledged $40 billion as the initial investment for the constitu-
tion of the fund. The SRF has four main shareholders: The State Administra-
tion of Foreign Affairs (65%), the China Investment Corporation (15%), the 
Export-Import Bank of China (15%) and the China Development Bank (5%). 
It represents another international institution that is under Chinese control 
and that has an important impact on the region. Both the AIIB and the SRF 
6  Both the Chinese President Xi Jinping and the ADB Chief Takehiko Nakao have expressed 
similar views on this cooperation will. 
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provide a channel for investment of Chinese capital in other countries, helping 
to diversify its energy and raw materials supply overseas and safeguard its na-
tional energy and economic security (Yu, 2017, p. 360). 
Why was the Belt and Road Initiative launched? 
Much has been written regarding the debate about whether the nature of the 
BRI is geopolitical or geoeconomic. In the official discourse, there is no do-
ubt that the starting point is economic. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the 
Chinese economy has entered a new period. It is facing different challenges 
and obstacles and it should find a new “engine for economic growth”. Efforts 
are focused on diversifying its economy, embracing a more sustainable level 
of growth, and distributing benefits more equally. The Chinese Government 
is taking measures in order to transform the “low-end, export-driven model 
into a more sustainable and innovative economy” (Pu, 2016, p. 114). However, 
trade remains a crucial driver for the Chinese economy and it seems that in 
the short-term it will continue to be so. As evidence points out, China is the 
largest exporting country in absolute terms in 2019 (see Figure 4), overcoming 
the US, Germany, or Japan.  
However, China’s dependency on trade is not as large as some may think. 
We could measure this dependency through two different indicators. The first 
way is to look at China’s export dependency (measured by percentage of GDP 
that exports of goods and services represent, see Figure 5) and import depen-
dency (measured by percentage of GDP that imports of goods and services re-
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2019 at the time of writing this paper. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data supplied by the World Bank.
Figure 5. 
Top 10 exporting countries 
worldwide in 2019
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present, see Figure 6). In both cases, we observe that China is below the world 
average. Although its average is higher than that of the US, it is lower than those 
of other Western countries such as Germany or the United Kingdom. 
The other way to measure China’s dependency on trade is through its “tra-
de openness” (sum of exports plus imports as percentage of GDP). By the 
same token, China’s percentage in 2019 was above that of the US (according 
to the World Bank, 35.68% vs. 26.39%, respectively), although lower than the 
world average (60.40%) and that of some European countries such as Ger-
many (88.10%) or the United Kingdom (64.25%). In this context, some stu-
dies highlight that the world’s relative exposure to China has increased, while 
China’s to the world has fallen (McKinsey Global Institute, 2019, p. 3).
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Figure 6. 
Exports of goods 
and services as percentage 
of GDP
Figure 7. 
Imports of goods and services 
as percentage of GDP
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This is precisely one of the main motivations of China behind the Belt 
and Road Initiative – to address the overcapacity problem of some economic 
sectors. The official political discourse of the Chinese Government outlines 
this point. One of the main goals of the BRI is to promote global trade and to 
strengthen economic cooperation between countries (National Development 
and Reform Comission, 2015). Geopolitical considerations aside, it is obvious 
that improving trade is considered part of the solution to this problem, since 
this would allow Chinese companies to sell products and services to other 
countries, reducing the excess of capacity. Concerns about China’s overcapa-
city in several industries have been raised all around the world. As evidence 
points out, excessive capacity in the coal industry is a deep problem (Zhang, 
Zhang, Liu, & Nie, 2017). The following quote is very representative about the 
relation between the BRI and the overcapacity problem:
The implementation of a new Silk Road strategy will help to revive 
China’s slowing domestic economy by boosting foreign trade and China’s out-
ward investment. This strategy will also allow China more time and room 
for pursuing industrial restructuring and upgrading. The slowdown in the 
Chinese economy has resulted in a serious problem of domestic production 
overcapacity in China’s heavy industries. Participating in the infrastructure 
projects financed by the AIIB will help to absorb China’s massive production 
overcapacity at home in manufacturing, infrastructure construction and re-
lated industries. (Yu, 2017, pp. 360–361)
Nonetheless, some economists are sceptical about the efficiency of the BRI 
in mitigating this issue. In relation to the steel industry, for example, some au-
thors estimate that the BRI might absorb “only” around 7% of China’s overca-
pacity (Yu, 2017, p. 358). In this regard, the BRI effects on solving this problem 
could be limited. 
In addition to this, another economic motivation is the internationaliza-
tion of the Renminbi (RMB). This is one of the main strategic lines of the 
Chinese Government. It is not something new that stems from the BRI, but 
a previous priority that is now backed by this initiative. The Renminbi is the 
eighth most used currency in the world nowadays, with 4.3% shares of average 
daily turnover in April 2019 (Bank of International Settlements, 2019, p. 3). 
Accordingly, the BRI seeks to increase popularity of the currency use in inter-
national transactions, increasing especially the liquidity of offshore RMB use. 
It is clear that the ease of paying and trading in Renminbi on the BRI routes 
would help to achieve this goal (Liu, 2015). Efforts should be made to “lower 
transaction costs, so as to increase the share of RMB in trade, investment, and 
foreign exchange reserve, which will inject momentum to make RMB an im-
portant international currency” (Pu, 2016, p. 114). 
However, the People’s Bank of China does not try to establish the RMB only 
as a global trade currency, but also as a global investment and reserve currency 
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(Bowles & Wang, 2013). Currently, China is a net capital exporter, and bearing 
in mind the BRI and the “Go Out policy” (走出去战略) of Chinese companies, 
the internationalization of the RMB is likely to be strengthened during the next 
few years. Although the effects on the international financial global order are 
difficult to gauge, some experts have argued that if there is to be a shift in the 
dominant reserve from the US Dollar to another currency in the next decades, 
that one would be the Chinese Renminbi (Subramanian, 2011, p. 22). 
Despite this bright future, threats lurk for the RMB. In this sense, Barry 
Eichengreen and Masahiro Kawai argue that: 
A high degree of RMB internationalisation requires significant capital 
account liberalization, […] which in turn would call for greater exchange 
rate flexibility so that the People’s Bank of China can enjoy monetary policy 
autonomy. This, however, would pose a challenge for the PRC authorities as 
hasty capital account liberalization could expose PRC financial markets to 
the risk of crisis. (Eichengreen & Kawai, 2014, p. 2)
Improving China’s energy security is another motivation behind the BRI. 
The economic growth of the Asian country over the last years has relied on 
energy imports, especially crude oil and natural gas (Wuthnow, 2017, p. 11). 
Due to this fact, piracy is a threat for Chinese energy shipments, especially in 
the Malacca Strait, were 80% of Chinese oil imports flow (U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration, 2015). In this sense, port construction in the Indian 
Ocean would bring new secure maritime routes for China, as well as cons-
tructing overland pipelines. These measures would avoid China’s dependence 
on the Strait of Malacca and would improve the time and security of China’s 
energy imports (Wuthnow, 2017, p. 11). 
From a domestic point of view, another motivation is the rebalance of regio-
nal development inside China. Since the opening process in the Chinese eco-
nomy and the establishment of Special Economic Zones, the Western Chinese 
regions are suffering a lack of infrastructure and strong trade routes that connect 
them with the coastal developed regions. During decades, technology was deve-
loped, and investment placed, on the Eastern regions. The Western regions are 
isolated in terms of efficient connectivity and economic equity. This situation 
has led to deep interprovincial inequalities (Liao & Wei, 2016, p. 5). 
In order to manage this grave problem, the Chinese Government has been 
developing regional programs such as “Western Development” (西部大开
发), “Revitalize the Northeast Industrial Bases” (振兴东北老工业基地) or 
“Rise of Central China Plan” (中部崛起计划). In this regard, the BRI could 
be a linkage between all these regional programs and, undoubtedly, represents 
the most ambitious plan for the development of the Western Chinese regions. 
This is especially important in the case of Xinjiang. Through development and 
prosperity in that region, the separatist tendencies of the Uighur minority 
could be reduced. As it has been stated, poverty is one of the main roots of te-
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rrorism and extremism (Haiyun, 2015, pp. 13–22). This could lead to stability 
in the region and could prove to be an example to other regions such as Tibet, 
were similar territorial claims are held. 
In addition, it must be said that the idea of the Silk Road has a strong ro-
mantic component. In the Chinese culture, this concept has a strong sense of 
“Chineseness”. It is conceived as something inherent to their civilization and 
their values. The use of this concept is, therefore, linked to a nationalist idea 
that would help, among other things, to strengthen China’s unity. 
The last type of motivation behind the BRI is of a diplomatic nature. The 
project fits into the framework of the new proactive foreign policy of Chi-
na. It is clear that Xi Jinping has established close ties with countries such as 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. But the so-called “peripheral diploma-
cy” (Swaine, 2014), in which the BRI suits, extends far beyond. The influence 
of China in other countries of Asia and even Africa or Europe is becoming 
higher. China, through the above-mentioned financial institutions, is lending 
large amounts of financial resources. As a consequence, the Asian country 
owns massive amounts of public and private debt from other countries, with 
the power of control this fact entails. Under the “win-win cooperation” appro-
ach for international relations fostered by the Chinese Government, China is 
creating a new regional order. It has integrated development, security, and ins-
titution-building in order to forge a new network with China in the epicentre 
(Callahan, 2016, p. 13). The expansion of its strategic influence, while avoiding 
a direct crash with the United States, seems to be another crucial driver in the 
BRI (Wuthnow, 2017, p. 8). 
Nevertheless, it is true that many risks and uncertainties in the horizon 
have been pointed out by experts. First of all, there are economic issues: cre-
dit risk from developing countries, macroeconomic risks, legal uncertainty, 
regulatory risks, or poor governance and corruption in partner states. On the 
geopolitical side, several security issues could be found such the fact that “Chi-
nese workers and investments could be subject to regional conflict as well as 
transnational challenges such as terrorism and piracy” (Wuthnow, 2017, p. 3). 
Additionally, some powers (for example the United States or Japan) “could 
oppose, either individually or collectively, China’s endeavors in key regions” 
(Wuthnow, 2017, p. 13). Finally, the BRI itself is a somewhat vague project wi-
thout a strong central authority that would coordinate the entire initiative. For 
these reasons, the success of the Belt and Road Initiative is subject to different 
problems, both current and foreseeable in the future. 
Conclusions
With the end of the Cold War, the international system shifted from a bipolar 
world with two major blocks (the US leading capitalism and the USSR leading 
communism) to a unipolar world dominated by the West (mainly by the US). 
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However, in the 21st century we are moving towards a multipolar world with 
different regional powers. This situation is especially noticeable in Asia, were 
different spheres of power converge (specially China, India, Russia, Japan, and 
the US). 
In this regard, nobody would contest the fact that China has risen. Its eco-
nomic development during the last decades has resulted in a position of in-
fluence, not only in regional terms but in world ones. It has consolidated its 
regional position in Asia, making a space for itself. In this sense, the Belt and 
Road initiative was launched in 2013 with several motivations behind. First of 
all, strengthening trade with other countries. This could prove to be a solution 
for the overcapacity issue in some economic sectors. Additionally, the BRI 
would help to transform China’s low-end economic model to a more innova-
tive one. Also, the internationalisation of the Renminbi and improving energy 
security are major priorities for the Chinese Government. From the domestic 
point of view, the BRI seeks to improve the development of some provinces by 
reducing regional disparities, and strengthen nationalism by using the BRI as 
a way of fighting terrorism. 
Another kind of motivation, which is the most controversial one, is the ex-
pansion of the diplomatic and strategic influence. Although the starting point 
of the BRI is geoeconomic, undoubtedly, the project has deep global geopo-
litical implications. It is not just a mere trade initiative. China is creating a 
new structure of international organisations (such as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), many of them 
surrounding or with links to the BRI, with its own norms and rules. Some of 
them are similar to those established by the liberal international order, and 
others are inspired by the Chinese vision of international order.
China’s influence through the BRI (and through other channels) in neigh-
bouring States has increased considerably. For example, the massive purchase 
of public and private debt from different countries is providing China a strong 
influence over their economy. Nevertheless, not only is the established order 
changing at a regional level, but also at a global one. China is becoming a rule-
making country instead of a rule-following one, as we can observe from the 
creation of different international organisations. This is having deep implica-
tions for the world in areas as different as private international law, trade and 
financial rules, etc. 
Regarding the international system, China is following a joint strategy – 
creating a new international architecture, and reforming (with support of un-
derrepresented countries such as the BRICS) the existing one. Now, the debate 
is about whether China will follow the current liberal international system, 
despite reshaping some aspects of it, or it will challenge the current global 
order, creating a new one with Chinese ideas in the centre. 
Nonetheless, the BRI still needs to face several economic and security 
issues and, of course, needs to face the opposition of other countries in or-
der to succeed. All in all, it is clear that China will influence the world as we 
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know now. However, to what extent China will change the world, only time 
will tell. In this regard, further research needs to be done in many aspects. 
The goal of this paper was much simpler – to provide the reader with an 
overview of the Belt and Road Initiative and the challenges it is going to 
create and face.
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